1. Class: Informal introduction to Game Theory. Games with two strategies and two players. Strict definition of “Game”. Definition of rational behavior and Nash Equilibrium.
2. Lecture: Demonstration of the existence of EN in games with a finite number of players and a finite number of strategies. Some examples.
3. Class: Evolutionary game theory. Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Replicator dynamics. The relationship between ESS and replicator equilibria and ash equilibria.
4. Lesson: Examples, many examples. Games in finite populations. If there is time: games with a continuous set of strategies: compact case and non-compact case.

References:
We will primarily use some lecture notes that will be freely distributed to students. We will also use:
1. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. J. Hofbauer & K. Sig- mund. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
2. Nowak, Martin (October 2006). “Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life”. Belknap Press. ISBN 0-674-02338-2.